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COMPETITION, INTEGRATION AND
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN THE EEC
FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE
PRIVATE FIRM
Michel Waelhroeck*

I
One of the main purposes of the EEC Treaty is to stimulate competition
between firms by opening up markets. That free movement of goods and
increased competition are closely related objectives is apparent from Article
3 of the Treaty, which states that the activities of the Community shall include, among others:
a) the elimination, as between Member States, of customs duties and of
quantitative restrictions on the import and ·export of goods, and of all other
measures having equivalent effect;
c) the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of
movement for persons, services and capital; [and]
f) the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the Common
Market is not distorted. 1
As early as 1956, experts appointed by the six original Member State
governments to investigate measures to pursue integration after the failure
of the European Defence Community clearly established this link between
the abolition of barriers to trade and an increase in the intensity of competition. In what has come to be known as the "Spaak Report," 2 the experts
noted the technology gap then separating Europe from the United States
and proposed, as a remedial measure, the creation of a ''vast zone of common economic policy, constituting a powerful production unit, and allowing a continued expansion, and increased stability, an accelerated
raising of the standard of living and the development of harmonious relations between the States belonging to it."3 The authors of the Spaak Report
envisioned an enlarged market in which firms would be able to grow to
optimum size without acquiring a de facto monopoly: ''The strength of a
vast market is to allow the combination of mass production with the ab* Professor of Law, Free University of Brussels. LLD. 1956, Free University of Brussels;
LL.M. 1958, New York University. -Ed.
1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 3, 298
U.N.T.S. 3 (1958) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
2. Report of the Heads of Delegations to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs presented to the
Intergovernmental Committee established by the Messian Conference, Apr. 21, 1956 [hereinafter cited as Spaak Report].
3. Spaak Report, supra note 2, at pt. 1, Introduction.

1439

1440

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 82:1439

sence of monopoly." 4 Moreover, it was felt that this wider market would
compel firms to do away with obsolete production methods and to increase
the quantity and quality of their goods. Thus, free movement of goods was
seen as a means of increasing competition, which itself was seen as a means
of enhancing economic efficiency.
The authors of the Spaak Report saw a need for rules on competition, as
a necessary complement to rules guaranteeing free movement of goods.
They stressed, among other considerations, the risk that private firms could
reestablish barriers between Member States by market sharing agreements,
dual-pricing practices, dumping and other discriminatory practices.5
However, the authors were aware that "a Common Market is not in all
cases the same thing as a completely free market." 6 In two sectors, agriculture and transport, it was realized that, in view of the extensive control
exercised by States over market mechanisms, the mere abolition of barriers
to trade would give rise to unequal conditions of competition. In order to
avoid serious social problems, it was felt that State interventionism should
not be abolished, but should instead be replaced by a Community intervention system providing for equivalent guarantees. Therefore, in these two
areas, the Treaty provides not only for free trade but also for the establishment of common regulatory policies based on uniform or harmonized legislative provisions.
In other areas, with a few exceptions,7 the elimination of trade barriers
is automatic; although approximation of legislation and coordination of
economic policies are called for, they are not a necessary pre-condition for
the realization of the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital
across national borders. In these other areas, 8 the end of the transitional
period (December 31, 1969) was the cut-off date by which all barriers, restrictions and discriminations in intra-Community relations had to be abolished, whether or not measures had been taken by that time to equalize
conditions of competition.9
The practical difficulties which the opening up of State borders might
cause were to be met by the adoption of safeguard measures, under Community supervision. Most of these measures, however, could be granted
only during the transitional period. 10

II
The transitional period expired more than fourteen years ago. Nevertheless, in many industries, economic conditions diverge widely among the
4. Id
5. Spaak Report, supra note 2, at pt. I, tit. III, ch. I, § I.
6. Spaak Report, supra note 2, at pt. I, Introduction.
1. See, e.g., EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 57(3) ("In the case of the medical and allied
pharmaceutical professions, the progressive abolition of restrictions shall be dependent upon
coordination of the conditions for their exercise in the various Member States."),
8. Except for capital movements: see EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 67; see also Public
Prosecutor v. Casati (Case No. 203/80), 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2595.
9. See Reyners v. Belgian State (Case No. 2/74), 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J, Rep. 631.
10. See EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 226.
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Member States. Different national policies concerning State aid, price control regulations, "buy national" purchasing policies, discriminatory tax regimes, differences in purchasing power, exchange rate fluctuations, and
incomplete harmonization of commercial policies vis-a-vis non-Member
countries give rise to unequal conditions of competition. To ignore these
differences and force private firms to treat the Member States as a single
market imposes on such firms a rather severe burden.
The Treaty provides a variety of remedies for these problems. If the
distortion of competition arises from a Treaty violation by a Member State,
articles 169-171 provide that the Commission and other Member States
have the right to bring an action before the Court of Justice. However, this
procedure is time consuming and individuals have no right to compel action to be taken against a Member State. 11 If the distortion is due to State
aid, articles 92-94 furnish the Commission with far-reaching remedial powers, which the Commission has only recently begun to exercise to any considerable extent. Here too, the process is time-consuming, and individuals
probably lack the right to force the Commission to take action. Distortions
resulting from other sources can only be eliminated by approximation of
legislation under articles 99-102, a procedure even slower and more cumbersome than that under articles 169-171 and 92-94. Nor do individuals
have any standing to demand that approximation activities be commenced.
Finally, the Treaty provides in general terms in articles 103 to 109 for the
coordination of Member States' economic policies. It is generally recognized that progress in that area has lagged far behind the realization of free
movement of goods, persons and services.

III
It is likely that the problems resulting from the lack of unified market
conditions will persist for some time to come. What, in the meantime,
should be the Community's reaction if firms opt for "self-help" in dealing
with this problem of nonuniformity, attempting unilaterally to remedy what
they often rightly perceive as severe handicaps?
Until now, the orthodox view, exemplified by the practice of the Commission and the case law of the Court of Justice, has been to ignore or
minimize the gravity of the problem. Numerous decisions have condemned
firms' attempts to protect themselves against the consequences of operating
in a free but nonunified market.
Thus, in Centrafarm B V v. Sterling Drug Inc. , 12 the court was asked
whether a patent owner could prevent importation of products which had
been sold by him or with his consent in another Member State where he
owned a parallel patent, where price differences existed resulting from the
exporting country's efforts to control the price of the products. The Court
stated:
It is part of the Community authorities' task to eliminate factors likely
to distort competition between Member States, in particular by the harmonization of national measures for the control of prices and by the prohibi11. See LUtticke v. Commission (Case No. 48/65), 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 19, 27.
12. (Case No. 15/74), 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147.
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tion of aids which are incompatible with the Common Market, in addition
to the exercise of their powers in the field of competition.
The existence of factors such as these in a Member State, however, cannot justify the maintenance or introduction by another Member State of
measures which are incompatible with the rules concerning the free movement of goods, in particular in the field of industrial and commercial
property.
The question referred should therefore be answered in the negative. 13
In United Brands v. Commission, 14 United Brands was found to have
abused its dominant position by charging its distributors prices which differed according to the Member State in which distributors were established.
In addition to denying its dominant position, United Brands argued, among
other things, that it had only been adjusting to different marketing conditions in the various Member States and charging in each Member State the
maximum price the market would bear. The Court answered:
Although the responsibility for establishing the single banana market
does not lie with the applicant, it can only endeavor to take "what the
market can bear'' provided that it complies with the rules for the regulation
and coordination of the market laid down by the Treaty. 15
In BMW Belgium SA v. Commission, 16 the Belgian sales subsidiary of a
German car manufacturer had been fined by the Commission for having
prevented a number of its Belgian dealers from reexporting German-made
cars to Germany. Although the Court noted that prices were appreciably
lower in Belgium than in other Member States, at least in part because of
the price-freezing measures imposed by the Belgian government, it upheld
the Commission's decision, .finding that BMW Belgium had committed an
intentional infringement of the competition rules.
Finally, in J)istillers v. Commission, 11 the Commission condemned the
dual pricing system which The Distillers Company Limited (DCL), an important producer of Scotch whisky, used in response to different marketing
conditions in the United Kingdom and in the continental EEC countries.
Distillers' claim that it was impossible to market the same brand of Scotch
whisky successfully at the same price in the United Kingdom and in the rest
of the EEC was rejected.

IV
How should one judge the "orthodox view"? Several responses can be
given to this question.
1. At first sight, it may seem unduly harsh to force firms to compete in
a nonunified economic environment without the right to protect themselves
from the resulting adverse consequences. It seems that the firms are correct
13. 1974 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 1164-65.
14. (Case No. 27/76), 1978 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 207.
15. 1978 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 298.
16. (Case Nos. 32/78, 36-82/78), 1979 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 2435.
17. Commission Decision 78/163/EEC, The Distillers Company Limited, Conditions of
Sale and Price Terms, Art. 85, 21 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 50) 16 (Feb. 22, 1978) (hereinafter
cited as Commission Decision].
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to object, as did United Brands, that the responsibility for establishing a
single market is not theirs.
However, this answer is superficial. It is not the purpose of the Treaty to
treat firms "nicely." Economic integration necessarily causes painful adjustments and requires sacrifices. Established producers will have to reorganize themselves, or even shut down, if they cannot adapt to new market
conditions.
2. A more fundamental objection is apparent if one considers an important goal of the opening-up of national borders: the elimination of less
efficient firms. In a situation of distorted competition, there is no guarantee
that this will happen: the brunt of the adjustment process may very well be
borne by efficient firms. The result may well be a decline in overall market
efficiency.
3. Even so, however, a proponent of the orthodox view might answer
that such a sacrifice may be temporarily necessary to stimulate further integration. Indeed, the process of European unification may have to proceed
for a time at a faster pace in some areas than in others, thereby creating
temporary imbalances. If adversely affected firms were allowed to shelter
themselves against these inequalities, part of the pressure towards further
progress would be removed. For instance, in Belgium the authorities are
becoming increasingly aware of the difficulty of enforcing price control
measures which are out of line with price levels in other Member States. If
the attempts of Sterling Drug and BMW Belgium to prevent parallel trade
had been permitted on the ground that the price differences causing that
trade were caused by nationally imposed controls, the pressure on the affected governments to avoid price discrepancies would be decreased.
Although the importance of this factor should not be overestimated, it
remains true that the "harsh" consequences of the orthodox view often help
further the integrative process. To put it differently, if the Commission considered the differences in the legislative and economic situations of the
Member States as justification for private obstacles to trade, part of the
pressure for further progress towards harmonization of market conditions
would be eliminated. The notion of a "common" market may appear in
some respects to be a legal fiction; however, as with many legal fictions, it
can be a useful tool for developing the law.
4. There are, however, limits to the validity of this reasoning. The
willingness of private firms to accept the fiction of a "common" market as if
it were reality is not limitless. When the Commission prohibited DCL's
dual pricing system, DCL withdrew its leading brand, Johnnie Walker Red
Label, from sale in the United Kingdom and priced three other brands (Vat
69, Dewars and Black & White) out of the U.K. market. Instead of fl.owing
freely into the Continent at the U.K. price, as the Commission had expected, DCL's main brands simply stopped being sold in the U.K. and
prices on the Continent remained unchanged. The Commission's decision
seemingly ignored the idea that firms cannot be forced to continue to sell in
parts of the Common Market where they consider market conditions to be
distorted to their detriment. Thus, by prohibiting firms from imposing restrictions on cross-border trade within the EEC, "orthodox" competition
policy occasionally compels firms to abandon a market totally, where the
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alternative involves the risk that their sales in that market will cause undesirable exports to other Member States. Such a result seems to be neither
economically nor politically justified. It is in direct contrast with the
Treaty's goal that goods purchased within the Community be supplied
without restriction to consumers throughout the Community. Arguably,
when distortions in market conditions are so great that firms deem it preferable to give up selling altogether in certain markets to protect their position
in other markets, allowing some restrictions of trade may be a "second
best" alternative to complete freedom of trade.
The Commission may be coming to realize this. For example, it recently published a notice under article 19 (3) ofregulation No. 17 indicating
its intention to exempt for three years DCL's "Promotion Equalization
Charge" system for Johnnie Walker Red Label. 18 The system constitutes
an amended version, limited to one brand, of the dual pricing system which
had been condemned by the Commission in December 1977. 19
Will the Court follow the same trend? It is too early to be able to answer with certainty. However, recent signs are not encouraging. Thus, in
Merck & Co. Inc. v. Stephar BV,20 the Court considered whether a patent
owner in one Member State (The Netherlands) was entitled under Article
36 to prevent the importation of a pharmaceutical product ("Moduretic")
which had been marketed in another Member State (Italy) where no patent
protection existed for the product. The Court answered negatively:
It is for the proprietor of the patent to decide, in the light of all the
circumstances, under what conditions he will market his product, including
the possibility of marketing it in a Member State where the law does not
provide patent protection for the product in question. If he decides to do
so he must then accept the consequences of his choice as regards the free
movement of the product within the Common Market, which is a fundamental principle forming part of the legal and economic circumstances
which must be taken into account by the proprietor of the patent in determining the manner in which his exclusive right will be exercised.21
The Membran v. GEMA case22 concerned the right of a copyright owner
to prevent imports of copyrighted sound recordings from the United Kingdom (where a system of statutory license was in force) into Germany
(where license agreements can be freely negotiated and royalties rates are
accordingly higher). The Court stated:
It should be further observed that in a common market distinguished
by free movement of goods and freedom to provide services an author,
acting directly or through his publisher, is free to choose the place, in any
of the Member States, in which to put his work into circulation. He may
make that choice according to his best interests, which involve not only the
level of remuneration provided in the Member State in question but other
18. Notice Pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No. 17 Concerning Notification
No. IV/30.228 (The Distillers Company p.l.c.) 26 0. J. EuR. CoMM. (No. C 245) 3 (Sept. 14,
1983).
19. Commission Decision, supra note 17, at 16.
20. (Case No. 187/80), 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2063.
21. 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2082.
22. (Case Nos. 55-57/80), 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 147.
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factors such as, for example, the opportunities for distributing his work and
the marketing facilities which are further enhanced by virtue of the free
movement of goods within the Community. In those circumstances, a
copyright management society may not be permitted to claim, on the importation of sound recordings into another Member State, payment of additional fees based on the difference in the rates of remuneration existing in
the various Member States.23
In effect, this means that where the owner of an industrial property right
is not entitled to reap the full benefit of his right in one Member State, he
risks losing his full reward in the other Member States as well unless he
withdraws his goods from the market of the first State.
One may wonder whether this result is consistent with the objectives of
the Treaty. In the view of the Treaty's authors, the purpose of the free
movement of goods is to promote free competition which, in tum, increases
economic efficiency. The Court's interpretation of article 36 of the Treaty
in the Merck and Membran cases seems to make the free movement of
goods an objective in itself, rather than a means to attain economic efficiency through increased competition. It may seriously be doubted whether
economic efficiency is advanced if Italian consumers are no longer able to
obtain Moduretic from Merck in Italy, but have to import it from another
Member State. An interpretation of article 36 which would have allowed
Merck to preserve its rights in those countries where it owned patents, while
continuing to sell in Italy, would arguably have better served economic efficiency, even if it would have involved allowing Merck to restrict imports
from Italy to The Netherlands. It would also have been more in keeping
with the purpose of article 36 - to allow restrictions of trade when these
are 'Justified on grounds of protection of industrial property." Pending the
unification of patent laws, a "second best" alternative would have been
preferable to the Court's intransigent insistence on free movement of goods
at all costs.
In this context it is worth noting that, in the agricultural sector, the
Court has held that charges on trade between Member States, such as monetary compensatory amounts, could be justified by the need to avoid distorting trade in these products. The Court apparently considered decisive
the fact that the common organizations of the agricultural markets are
based on common prices, whereas economic and monetary policies have
not yet been harmonized and therefore lead to fluctuations in exchange
rates.
In the Balkan case24 the Court acknowledged that:
Although the compensatory amounts do constitute a partitioning of the
market, here they have a corrective influence on the variations in fluctuating exchange rates which, in a system of market organization for agricultural products based on uniform prices, might cause disturbances in trade
in these products.
Diversion of trade caused solely by the monetary situation can be considered more damaging to the common interest, bearing in mind the aims
23. 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 165.
24. Balkan Import-Export GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Berlin-Packhof (Case No. 5/73), 1973
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1091.
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of the common agricultural policy, than the disadvantages of the measures
in dispute.
Consequently these compensatory amounts are conducive to the maintenance of a normal flow of trade under the exceptional circumstances created temporarily by the monetary situation.
They are also intended to prevent the disruption in the Member State
concerned of the intervention system set up under Community
Regulations.
Furthermore, these are not levies introduced by some Member States
unilaterally, but Community measures which, bearing in mind the exceptional circumstances of the time, are permissible within the framework of
the common agricultural policy.25
In theRacke judgment,26 rendered a few years later, the Court repeated:
The monetary compensatory amounts are not levies introduced by
some Member States unilaterally but Community measures adopted to
deal with the difficulties resulting for the common agricultural policy from
monetary instability; they are not therefore covered by the prohibitions on
levying charges having an effect equivalent to customs duties. 27
Although these cases concerned agricultural goods, it is submitted that
there is no fundamental reason not to apply similar reasoning to industrial
goods. Provisions of the Treaty, such as articles 36 and 85,28 should not be
applied so rigidly as to effectively compel private firms to withdraw their
goods from certain national markets where the conditions of competition
within the Common Market are so distorted by the disharmonization of
national measures that they are unable to maintain an adequate level of
profitability.

25. 1973 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 1113.
26. Finna A. Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, (Case No. 136/77) 1978 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep.
1245.
27. 1978 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rec. at 1245. See also, as to the legality of the "clawback"

provision provided for under the co=on organization of the market in sheep meat, Kind KG
v. European Econ. Co=. (Case No. 106/81), 1982 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rec. 2885. As to the
legality of a compensatory tax on ethyl alcohol under Article 46 of the Treaty, see St. Nikolaus
Brennerei und Likllrfabrik v. Hauptzollamt Krefeld, (Case No. 337/82) (not yet published).
28. EEC Treaty, supra note I, arts. 36 & 85.

